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The Marine Mammal Protection Act
and International Protection of
Cetaceans: A Unilateral Attempt to
Effectuate Transnational Conservation
ABSTRACT

This Note examines how the United States has used the Marine Mammal Protection Act to further international protection of cetaceans-dolphins, porpoises, and whales. The author first reviews the
manifold reasonsfor protecting cetaceans. The author next describes the
international operation of the Act as amended in 1984 by surveying
those sections that have an impact on United States relations with other
states and the regulations and cases that implement those sections. The
author concludes that these restrictionshave produced a decline in porpoise mortality, although more can be done. The author next describes
the successes of the Act's treaty program. Several cetacean species are
listed in a protective treaty as endangered, resulting in a prohibitionon
internationaltrade in those species and their products. United States efforts have produced an international moratorium on whaling. The author continues by examining the 1988 Amendments to the Act. Under the
amendments, many restrictionson commercialfishers have been lifted on
an interim basis to give the United States Secretary of Commerce enhanced flexibility in dealing with both domestic andforeign fishingfleets.
Tuna fishers, however, who pose a danger to porpoises, face even more
stringent restrictions than previously, thus holding the Act true to its
primary purpose. Finally, the author concludes that, although the Act
has had some success, Congress has often been unwilling to impose economic burdens on fishers, and even in many instances when Congress
has acted strongly, the executive has been lax in enforcement.
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INTRODUCTION

Congress passed the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972'
(MMPA or Act), in reaction partially to threats of extinction of whales
by whalers,2 and especially to the incidental killing of porpoises by the
United States tuna fleet purse-seining 3 in the Pacific Ocean.' These
1. Pub. L. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407

(1988)).
2. See 16 U.S.C. § 1361(1) (1988); see also Recent Development, Congress Amends
the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 62 OR. L. REv. 257, 258-59 (1983).
3. Purse-seining is a practice of fishers who take advantage of the fact that, in the
eastern tropical Pacific Ocean, yellowtail tuna swim beneath schools of certain species of
dolphins and porpoises. The fishers set their nets around the porpoises to trap the tuna.
Many of the porpoises become entangled in the nets and are drowned. This practice is
often referred to as setting "on" or fishing "on" the cetacean at issue. See Levin, Toward
Effective Cetacean Protection, 12 NAT. RESOURcES LAw. 549, 562-64 (1979); Scarff,
The InternationalManagement of Whales, Dolphins, and Porpoises:An Interdisciplinary Assessment (pt. 1), 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 323, 379 (1977). For a more detailed account
of the effects of a purse-seining set on dolphins, see Brower, The Destruction of Dolphins, THE ATLANTIC, July 1989, at 35, 37.
According to one eye-witness, "These dolphins are rounded up with helicopters, explosives and speed boats. They are literally bombed into submission, captured in mile-long
nets . . . ." Transcript, West 57th: Pacific Dolphins:Slaughter at Sea, at 9 (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 1, 1989) [hereinafter West 57th] (statement of Sam LaBudde). On
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mammals continuously face serious menaces. By the mid-1970s, whalers
had reduced the world's number of whales from approximately 3.9 million to approximately 2.1 million.5 In the 1960s, whalers were particularly destructive, killing two or three times more whales than they had
killed in any previous decade.' Dolphins and porpoises were also endangered; when Congress enacted the MMPA, purse-seining for tuna was
causing the death of over 250,000 porpoises each year." According to a
1988 estimate, since the 1960s, a total of six million porpoises were
killed in purse-seining operations. 8 In 1989, tuna fishers were still killing three hundred dolphins each day.'
In 1981, Congress amended the MMPA to correct some of its technical and linguistic inadequacies 0 and to address the development of new
fishing techniques that might lessen porpoise mortality.1 1 In 1984, Con-

the other hand, some United States tuna fishers have gone to great lengths to prevent
porpoise kills. Chris Croft, a government observer and marine biologist testifies, "I saw
men trying to make a living and doing everything they could to keep from killing one
dolphin. I've seen them swimming in the nets at night with sharks and trying to release
as many dolphins as possible." Id.
4. Recent Development, supra note 2, at 259. For support for the proposition that
the primary motivation for the Act was the deaths of porpoises in the nets of tuna fishers,
see American Tunaboat Ass'n v. Baldrige, 738 F.2d 1013, 1014 (9th Cir. 1984); Committee for Humane Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson, 414 F. Supp. 297, 306 (D.D.C.
1976); Brower, supra note 3, at 38; Zimmerman, BaldrigelMurazumiAgreement: The
Supreme Court Gives Credence to an Aberration in American Cetacean Society III, 14
B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 257, 267 n.64 (1987). Although Richardson was revised on
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recognized that Congress enacted the MMPA to address porpoise mortality. Committee for
Humane Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson, 540 F.2d 1141, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
5. Scarff, supra note 3, at 330; see Kindt & Wintheiser, The Conservationand Protection of Marine Mammals, 7 U. HAw. L. REV. 301, 323-27 (1985) (species-by-species
review of the decline in whale populations).
6. Levin, supra note 3, at 560.
7. Scarff, supra note 3, at 379. Some put the estimates as high as 400,000 porpoise
deaths per year. Levin, supra note 3, at 565.
8. Drive to Stop Killing by Tuna Fleets is Given New Impetus, Christian Science
Monitor, Apr. 14, 1988, at 3, col. 1 [hereinafter Drive to Stop]; Brower, supra note 3, at
38. Six million is a conservative figure because the official estimates do not account for
porpoise deaths from other causes, such as exhaustion and shark attacks. Id.
9. West 57th, supra note 3, at 9.
10. Recent Development, supra note 2, at 265-71.
11. Id. at 272-74. Between the 1972 enactment of the MMPA and 1977, porpoise
deaths dropped from about 300,000 per year to about 27,000 per year because of improved fishing techniques. Kindt, A Summary ofIssues Involving MarineMammals and
Highly Migratory Species, 18 AKRON L. REV. 1, 7 (1984). By 1980, this figure had
further decreased to approximately 15,000. Recent Development, supra note 2, at 273.
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gress again amended the Act in recognition of the prominent place foreign fleets had gained in the tuna industry." Although foreign tuna fishers were responsible for only two percent of the tuna catch in the year
before the MMPA's enactment, by the mid-1970s, the percentage was
climbing rapidly."3 By the late 1980s, only sixteen percent of canned
tuna came from the the United States tuna fleet. 4 It is noteworthy that
tuna fishing is not the only danger to dolphins and porpoises; for example, porpoises are also taken incidentally in Japanese salmon gill-net
fisheries and in shark-net fisheries in Uruguayan waters."5 In November
1988, Congress again amended the MMPA to address the needs of both
fishers and porpoises. 6
This Note addresses the relation of the MMPA to international protection of cetaceans-dolphins, porpoises, and whales. 17 Part II examines
the importance of cetaceans and explores reasons for their protection.
Part III discusses those sections of the Act as amended in 1984 that address international activities and the actions of the United States to enforce and comply with those sections. Part IV examines the 1988 amendments and considers their possible impact.
II.

THE VALUE OF CETACEANS

The MMPA protects cetaceans and other marine mammals because
they are "resources of great international significance, esthetic and recreational as well as economic."1 Other writers have set forth ecological,

Research and development, however, has slowed and has not produced any major developments since the late 1970s. Brower, supra note 3, at 58.
12. Drive to Stop, supra note 8.
13. Kindt & Wintheiser, supra note 5, at 347.
14. Croft, America's Favorite Fish Tainted by Porpoise Deaths, Los Angeles Times,
Apr. 17, 1988, § V, at 3, col. 1, 6, col. 2.
15. Scarff, supra note 3, at 380.
16. See infra notes 223-25 and accompanying text.
17. Cetaceans are divided into two suborders: mysticeti (baleen whales) and
odontoceti (toothed whales). These suborders roughly correspond to the categories generally used by the whaling industry-large cetaceans (whales) and small cetaceans. There
is an overlap; sperm whales, which are odontocetes, are considered large cetaceans
whereas pygmy right whales, which are mysticetes, are grouped as small cetaceans. Dolphins and porpoises are odontocetes. Scarff, supra note 3, at 329 & n.8.
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1361(6) (1988). This subsection reads in full:
[Miarine mammals have proven themselves to be resources of great international
significance, esthetic and recreational as well as economic, and it is the sense of the
Congress that they should be protected and encouraged to develop to the greatest
extent feasible commensurate with sound policies of resource management and that
the primary objective of their management ghould be to maintain the health and
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scientific, horal, and ethical reasons for protecting cetaceans.19 These
reasons are examined below.
A. Economic Value
Cetaceans have direct and indirect economic value." Today, whales
are used principally as a food source for both animals and humans.2" In
1972, the worldwide market for whale products was approximately $100
million.2 2 At the same prices, a maximum sustainable harvest from undepleted stocks would have been worth approximately $500 million.23
Economic reasons also are used to justify the slaughter of small
cetaceans by the fishing industry. At its peak, the United States tuna
fleet employed 6,800 workers directly and 21,000 workers indirectly; another 10,000 individuals worked in tuna canneries.2 4 The 1.5 billion cans
of tuna produced in 1975 were worth $820 million.25 By 1989, the
United States tuna industry was bringing in $2 billion a year.26 The
Japanese and others in the South Pacific, North Atlantic, Black Sea, and
West Indies eat dolphins and porpoises for an economical source of protein.27 Fishermen in several parts of the world claim cetaceans interfere
with their activities.' A market for live dolphins has also developed;
stability of the marine ecosystem. Whenever consistent with this primary objective,
it should be the goal to obtain an optimum sustainable population keeping in mind
the carrying capacity of the habitat.
Id. Some criticize this approach as protecting cetaceans for humanity's sake rather than
for the sake of the cetaceans themselves. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 3, at 577.
19. See infra notes 46-47, 52-67 and accompanying text.
20. For example, whale oil has been used for lamp fuel, margarine, candles, perfume, cosmetics, lipsticks, cold creams, crayons, textile oils, watch oil, printing ink, shampoo, soap, suntan oil, wax, and intercontinental missile lubricants. Scarff, supra note 3,
at 341; Smith, The International Whaling Commission: An Analysis of the Past and
Reflections on the Future, 16 NAT. RESOURCES LAwv, 543, 544 n.11 (1984); Comment,
Enforcement Questions of the International Whaling Commission: Are Exclusive Economic Zones the Solution?, 14 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 114, 118 & n.37 (1984).
21. Scarff, supra note 3, at 341; Comment, supra note 20, at 118. Baleen whale
meat, nutritious and considered "an excellent alternative" to beef, is eaten chiefly by
humans. Scarff, supra note 3, at 341 & n.64.
22. Scarff, supra note 3, at 342.
23. Id.
24. Levin, supra note 3, at 561.
25. Id.
26. West 57th, supra note 3, at 10.
27. Coggins, Legal Protectionfor Marine Mammals: An Overview of Innovative
Resource Conservation Legislation, 6 ENVTL. L. 1, 5 (1975).
28. Fishermen off the Florida coast complain that dolphin interference with fishing
for Spanish and king mackerel, bluefish, pots, and pompano costs them approximately
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Europeans have allegedly paid as much as $23,000 for a healthy dolphin
29
and price tags of $5,000 to $10,000 are commonplace.
Significantly, many experts claim that there are non-consumptive substitutes for most if not all cetacean by-products.3 0 Economically, nonconsumptive uses of cetaceans may outweigh consumptive uses. In 1976,
a conservative estimate of the value of non-consumptive uses of all
marine mammals was over $225 million.3" While the assertion that
"[t]he [tuna] industry is as concerned as the public in reducing marine
mammal taking by the tuna fleet"3 2 may be an over-statement, the continued vitality of porpoises is important to tuna fishers because porpoise
depletion potentially increases the difficulty of locating tuna.33
B.

Ecological and Scientific Value

The continued deliberate hunting and allowance of incidental deaths
of cetaceans risks extinction of the species without full recognition of the
ecological consequences. 3 Cetaceans generally breed only within biogeographically distinct groups known as population stocks. Once a stock is
depleted within a geographical area, hundreds to thousands of years may
elapse before that species reinhabits that area.3" This depletion could
result in "non-natural" evolution that might wreak havoc on the world's
ecosystem.36
Research on whales is difficult. 7 In the past, dead whales were the
only source of scientific information.3 8 Even though scientists now study
live whales, basic information is still hard to acquire; the size of whales
makes their study in captivity unfeasible, and their migrations over long

$440,000 a year. Dolphins and killer whales also interfere with fishing in the Mediterranean and in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Kindt & Wintheiser, supra note 5, at 343-

44.
29. "Levin, supra note 3, at 586.

30.

For example, the jojoba, an easily cultivated desert shrub, produces "sperm oil."

Travalio & Clement, International Protection of Marine Mammals, 5 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 199, 204 n.31 (1979).
31. Scarff, supra note 3, at 342.
32. Recent Development, supra note 2, at 274 (emphasis added).
33. Levin, supra note 3, at 564; Kindt, supra note 11, at 18.
34. Travalio & Clement, supra note 30, at 205.
35. Scarff, supra note 3, at 334-35.

36. Id. at 385-86.
37. Travalio & Clement, supra note 30, at 205 n.38.
38. Id. Ironically, one of the reasons the Soviet Union and Peru gave for opposing
the International Whaling Commission's moratorium on whaling was that it would hamper whale research. Comment, supra note 20, at 127 n.125.
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distances make research very expensive.3 9
Cetaceans are also of great interest to the scientific community for
what they can teach us, about both themselves and humans. Cetaceans,
especially dolphins, have long been considered highly intelligent."'
Cetaceans, alone among animals, have brains of greater size and more
convolutions-the measure of potential intelligence-than humans, 1 but
scientific investigation into their mental development is still in its early
stages."2 Scientists have studied the long distance communications of fin
whales 43 and contend that increased understanding of the respiratory
adaptions of deep-diving whales may produce data capable of human
utilization." Scientists hope that additional understanding of whales and
their relationships to their ecosystems will contribute to the field of sociobiology. 45 Dolphins have advanced scientific knowledge of mammalian

physiology, neuroanatomy, and psychology.' From their place at the top
of the ocean's food chains, small cetaceans are also good indicators of
marine pollution.' 7
C.

Recreational and Aesthetic Value

Some writers assert that cetaceans are so unique that no further justification for their conservation is required.'8 Whales have long appealed

39. Comment, supra note 20, at 124 n.101. Most whale population studies base their
figures on sightings (live whales actually seen and counted), markings (the identification
of individual whales previously counted), and catch effort (a formula devised to reflect
numerically the effort required to catch and kill whales). Id. at 127 n.122.
40. Id. at 119. High cetacean intelligence was recognized as early as 1671. Id.
41. Id. at 119 n.46. Cetaceans have had brains of this size almost thirty million years
longer than humans. Travalio & Clement, supra note 30, at 206.
42. Comment, supra note 20, at 119.
43. Scarff, supra note 3, at 343.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 377.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Kindt & Wintheiser, supra note 5, at 365. Dr. Victor Scheffer, former
Chairman of the United States Marine Mammal Commission, writes:
Whales are different. They live in families, they play in the moonlight, they talk
to one another, and they care for one another in distress. They are awesome and
mysterious. In their cold, wet, and forbidding world they are complete and successful. They deserve to be saved, not as potential meatballs but as a source of encouragement to mankind.
Scarff, supra note 3, at 385 n.350 (quoting Scheffer, The Status of Whales, 29 PACIFIC
DISCOVERY 2, 8 (1976)).
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to artists and sculptors. 49 Today, hundreds of thousands of fascinated
persons turn out in California and South America to watch whale migrationsY' A pair of commentators phrased the aesthetic justification: "A

world with diminishing natural beauty and wonder left to preserve
should require substantial returns before sacrificing any of these unique
and lovely forms of life."5"
D.

Moral and Ethical Reasons for Protection

Great minds have long considered the killing of cetaceans morally offensive. 2 Some writers postulate that our ability to justify conservation
on moral grounds may depend on the species's similarity to humans 53 or
some other shared identity with the species.5 4 Other writers propose that
humans are not alone in their possession of self-consciousness and in
their abilities to reason and to express themselves creatively. 5 Evidence
of cetacean brain size and convolutions58 suggests that cetaceans may
share at least some of these "human" characteristics. 5 7 Cetaceans possess
many distinct human attributes.5 They are peaceful, playful, able to
communicate both within their own species and with other marine mammals, and they form strong family and social units. 9 Cetaceans also
seem to sense a unique relationship with mankind; they teach their
young that humans are special and not to be injured."
Some argue that deliberate extinction is morally wrong because it un-

49. Scarff, supra note 3, at 343.
50. Id. at 342.
51. Travalio & Clement, supra note 30, at 205.
52. In the second century A.D., a Greek poet wrote:
The hunting of dolphins is immoral, and that man can no more draw nigh the
gods as a welcome sacrificer nor touch their altars with clean hands but pollutes
those who share the same roof with him whoso willfully devises destruction of
dolphins. For equally with human slaughter the gods abhor the deathly doom of
the monarchs of the deep.
Scarff, supra note 3, at 383 n.341 (quoting Oppian of Cilicia).
53. Id. at 384 n.342.
54. Smith, The EndangeredSpecies Act and Biological Conservation,57 S. CAL. L.
REV. 361, 377 (1984).
55. Levin, supra note 3, at 552.

56. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
57. See Ridgway, PhysiologicalObservationson Dolphin Brains, in
NITION AND BEHAVIOR:

A

COMPARATIVE APPROACH

& F. Wood eds. 1986).
58.

Travalio & Clement, supra note 30, at 207.

59. Id. at 206-07.
60. Id. at 207.

DOLPHIN

COG-

31 (R. Schusterman, J. Thomas
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necessarily deprives future generations of resources that potentially carry
benefits not yet discovered."1 They claim that such destruction represents
and further increases a devaluation of life generally, accompanied by an
insensitivity to the suffering of other life forms."e
The values emphasized above, however, are rather anthropocentric. 63
The elemental, non-human-centered, ethical arguments focus on the irreversible nature of total extinction of a unique life form;" this is morally wrong regardless of any effect on humanity. 5 Extinction permanently interrupts the cycle of life and death by leaving a void in the
earth's interconnected biological community. 6 Some commentators even
perceive human-created extinction as playing God: "Whatever the Nature of the Creator he surely did not intend that the forms on which he
bestowed the gift of life should be exterminated by man."6 7
III.

THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE MARINE MAMMAL
PROTECTION ACT

All aspects of the MMPA arguably transcend the boundaries of the
United States. Because cetaceans frequently migrate into and out of
United States territorial waters,6 8 a taking-even inside United States
waters-could easily have an impact on international relations. More
frequently, much of the United States activity that harms cetaceans takes
place on the high seas. Those activities, however, are beyond the scope of

61. Scarff, supra note 3, at 381; Smith, supra note 54, at 376.
bodes
62. Smith, supra note 54, at 376-77. Biologist Sam LaBudde observes, "[I]t
very poorly for the direction of our society and maybe for the future of our planet if we
cannot even adopt a nurturing attitude toward a species as special in the hearts and
minds of the American people as the dolphins." West 57th, supra note 3, at 12.
63. See, e.g., Brower, supra note 3, at 56 ("It's a little narcissistic of us, isn't it, to
value dolphins because of [their intelligence].").
64. Smith, supra note 54, at 380.
65. Travalio & Clement, supra note 30, at 206; Scarff, supra note 3, at 381.
66. Senator Alan Cranston observes:
[Tihe death of a species is profound, for it means nature has lost one of its components, which played a role in the interrelationship of life on earth.
Here the cycle of birth and death ends. Here there is no life, no chance to begin
again-simply a void.
To cause the extinction of a species, whether by commission or omission, is
unqualifiedly evil. The prevention of this extinction, thus, must be a tenet among
man's moral responsibilities.
Scarff, supra note 3, at 381 n.326 (quoting 116 CONG. REc. 17,198 (1970) (statement of
Sen. Cranston)).
67. Id. (quoting G. SMALL, THE BLUE WHALE 213 (1971)).
68. Kindt, supra note 11, at 9.
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this Note. The focus here is on the requirements of the Act that affect
United States relations with other states.
A.

The Restrictions of the Marine Mammal Protection Act

1. The Moratorium
The MMPA provides for a moratorium on the taking and importation
of cetaceans and cetacean products. 9 The Act defines "moratorium" as a
"complete" prohibition on such taking and importation.7 0 There are,
however, important exceptions to the moratorium. The United States
Secretary of Commerce may issue permits71 for taking or importation if
certain conditions specified in the Act are met.7 2 A party may take or
import cetaceans for research or public display provided an application
for a permit is reviewed by both the Marine Mammal Commission
(MMC) and the Committee of Scientific Advisors on Marine Mammals
and provided both bodies find that granting the permit is consistent with
the purposes of the Act.7 If these bodies recommend the requested action
and the Secretary approves importation, the importer receives a certificate to present to customs officials. 4
The Act allows the incidental taking of cetaceans in commercial fishing operations pursuant to regulations and permits, but it grants the
United States Secretary of the Treasury the power to ban the importation of fish or fish products caught in such operations if the technology
used results in cetacean deaths or injuries that exceed the numbers allowed by United States standards. 5 The government of the fish exporting state must supply "reasonable proof" of the effects of its fishing technology on cetaceans to determine whether a party has met the United
States standards.7 6 If yellowfin tuna caught through purse-seining in the

69. . 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1988). According to the Act, "[t]he term 'take' means to
harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine
mammal." Id. § 1362(12). The MMPA does not define importation. See id. § 1362.
70. Id. § 1362(7).
71. For a more detailed description of the permit requirements, see infra part III,
section A.4.
72. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a). The United States Department of Commerce administers
the part of the MMPA that governs cetaceans. Recent Development, supra note 2, at
261. For a discussion of the conditions under which taking or importation is allowed, see
infra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
73. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(1). For a statement of the purposes and policies of the
MMPA, see id. § 1361.

74. Id. § 1371(a)(1).
75. Id. § 1371(a)(2).
76. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(A).
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eastern tropical Pacific are imported, the government of the exporter
must meet a further two-part test by producing "documentary evidence"
that it has regulations governing incidental takings of cetaceans comparable to the United States program and that those regulations have produced an average incidental taking rate comparable to that of United
States vessels."
In conformity with the purposes and policies of the Act, the Secretary,
in consultation with the MMC, may waive the requirements of the moratorium section, promulgate regulations, and issue permits if the "best
scientific evidence available" suggests that this is properY Even under
this subsection, however, importation is not allowed if the exporting state
does not have a program certified as consistent with the purposes of the
MMPA.7 9 Importation from a non-certified state is not allowed even if
the product is imported merely to be processed for exportation."s Only
scientific researchers may take or import depleted species during the
moratorium.81
2.

The Prohibitions

The MMPA contains several prohibitions. Unless provided for in a
treaty to which the United States is party, no one may take a cetacean
within United States territorial jurisdiction or use any place within
United States territorial jurisdiction for any purpose connected with cetacean taking or importation. 2 Those subject to United States jurisdiction may not take cetaceans on the high seas; 3 yet, even United States
citizens may take cetaceans in the territorial waters of another state.8 4 In
United States v. Mitchell, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit struck down a National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
regulation that prohibited, without geographical restriction, all subjects
of United States jurisdiction from violating the Act.85 The court noted
that Congress had the authority to pass legislation controlling the conduct of citizens within foreign territory" but determined that the con77. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(B).
78. Id. § 1371(a)(3)(A).

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. § 1371(a)(3)(B); see supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (limits on
taking and importation by researchers).
82. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(2) (1988).

83. Id. § 1372(a)(1).
84. United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
85. Id. at 999, 1005.
86. Id. at 1001.
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spicuous absence of such a restriction in the presence of controls over
activities within United States territory and on the high seas meant that
Congress had decided that the activity should go unregulated."7 Finding
that the nature of the MMPA does not require extraterritorial application and that there is implicit congressional intent not to do so, the court
reversed Mitchell's criminal conviction for taking dolphins in Bahamian
waters."8
Except as permitted for scientific research, a party may not import
cetaceans if the cetaceans are pregnant, are nursing or are less than eight
months old when taken, are taken from a depleted species or population
stock, or are taken in an inhumane manner.8 9 At least one court has
strictly interpreted these restrictions. In Animal Wefare Institute v.
Kreps,90 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit invalidated a waiver of the moratorium that allowed the importation of underage and nursing marine mammals.91 The court held that
the age requirement refers to individual marine mammals, not groups or
populations of marine mammals, and noted that while a few of these
marine mammals are still imported accidently, blatant importation is
forbidden. 2 On the issue of the nursing restriction, the Government tried
to draw a distinction between obligatory and convenience nursing. But
the court found that the nursing prohibition was not enacted to maintain
populations as the Government's position implied; rather, the prohibition
served "as a measure of infancy, of vulnerability and [of] helplessness." 93
The court considered the statute an emotional rather than scientific enactment aimed at stopping actions considered "intolerably cruel."9 In so
doing, the court strictly construed the statute according to its plain meaning.9 5 Although Animal Welfare Institute dealt with sealskins,96 it may
well serve as precedent for cetacean cases.
87. Id. at 1004.
88. Id. at 997, 1002-03.
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(b) (1988). The only apparent limits on such importations by
scientific researchers are those imposed by section 1371(a)(1). See supra notes 71-73 and
accompanying text.
90. 561 F.2d 1002 (D.C.Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Fouke Co. v. Animal
Welfare Institute, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
91. Id. at 1014.
92. Id. at 1011.
93. Id. at 1011-12.
94. Id. at 1012.
95. Id. ("The statute is plain; it bars importation of any animal which was 'nursing
at the time of taking.' [W]e [refuse] to narrow the unambiguous command of the
statute. . .").
96. Id. at 1004.
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A party may not import cetaceans if they are taken in violation of the
exporting state's laws,9" if the animal from which a cetacean product is
made is illegal to import, or if the sale of the product is illegal in the
exporting state.9 If fish are caught in a manner impermissble to those
subject to United States jurisdiction, a party may not import these fish
regardless of whether cetaceans were actually taken when the fish were
99
caught.
3.

The Regulations

The United States Secretary of Commerce is empowered to prescribe
regulations concerning the taking and importing of cetaceans. 100 The
Secretary is directed to promulgate species-specific regulations which
may focus even on a single population stock.101 Consistent with the purposes of the Act, the regulations shall insure that species and populations
stocks are not disadvantaged. 0 ' The Act provides several factors that the
Secretary may consider when prescribing the regulations. 0 3 These factors include the possible effects of the regulations on
(1) existing and future levels of [cetacean] species and population stocks;
(2) existing international treaty and agreement obligations of the United
States;
(3) the marine ecosystem and related environmental considerations;
(4) the conservation, development, and utilization of fishery resources; and
(5) the economic and technological feasibility of implementation.'"
The Act also provides a non-exhaustive list of possible regulatory restrictions concerning various factors: (1) the number of cetaceans taken or
imported pursuant to permits; (2) the age, sex, size, or any combination
thereof of cetaceans taken or imported, even if the regulations do not
prescribe a quota for the species; (3) the time period in which cetaceans
may be taken or imported; (4) the manner of taking; (5) the location
where cetaceans may be taken or imported; and (6) fishing techniques
causing excessive kill rates of cetaceans.' 0 5 Prior to or concurrently with
notification of an intention to prescribe regulations, the Secretary must
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

16 U.S.C. § 1372(c)(1) (1988).
Id. § 1372(c)(2).
Id. § 1372(c)(3).
See id. §§ 1372(c)(3), 1373(a).
Id. § 1373(a).
Id.
Id. § 1373(b).
Id.
Id. § 1373(c).
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publish statements of the estimated level of the species and population
stocks in question, of the anticipated impact of the regulations on those
species and stocks, and of the evidence on which the regulations are
based, as well as any studies commissioned by the Secretary or recom10 6
mendations of the Secretary or the MMC relating to the regulations.
10 7
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
through NMFS has promulgated highly detailed regulations. Although
some are simply reiterations of portions of the MMPA, 0 8 most of the
regulations go beyond the Act and specify how to execute it. For example, one regulation gives NMFS enforcement powers, although by agreement it may act in coordination with other federal agencies or with officials from the states and territories.10 9 In a crucial section, the
regulations set forth the conditions that allow a party to import fish
caught under circumstances where incidental takings of cetaceans are
likely to occur.11 0
The regulations forbid the importation of certain fish caught under
circumstances in which regulations required a United States citizen to
have a certificate of inclusion in a general permit-even if no cetaceans
were actually taken"'-unless it was found that, although the specific
United States requirements were not met, only comparable rates of incidental mortality and serious injury were achieved. 12 This prohibition
covered fishing for yellowfin tuna, salmon, and halibut."' a Yellowfin
Tuna Certificates of Origin and bills of lading from all states whose flag
vessels were involved in catching the tuna in question had to accompany
all yellowfin tuna imports. 1 ' The Yellowfin Tuna Certificate of Origin
had to include (1) the fishing vessel's state of origin; (2) the identities
and addresses of the exporter and consignee; (3) the identity and quantity of the tuna being imported; (4) the names of the fishing vessels; (5)

106. Id. § 1373(d).
107. Recent Development, supra note 2, at 261.
108. Compare 50 C.F.R. § 216.11(a)-(b) (1988) with 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(1),
(a)(2)(A); 50 C.F.R. § 216.12 with 16 U.S.C. § 1372(b)-(c); 50 C.F.R. § 216.13 with 16
U.S.C. § 1372(a)(2)(B), (a)(3)-(5). 50 C.F.R. § 216.11(c), which does not correspond to
any provision of the Act, was the regulation at issue in Mitchell. See supra notes 84-88
and accompanying text.
109. 50 C.F.R. § 216.8.

110. Id. § 216.24(e).
111. See id. § 216.24(b)-(d) (setting out requirements for general permits and certificates of inclusion for United States citizens).

112. Id. § 216.24(e)(1).
113.

Id. § 216.24(e)(2).

114. Id. § 216.24(e)(4)(i).
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the fishing method used; and (6) any other documentation that the appropriate administrator required. 15 Either an official of the vessel's state
or the vessel master had to sign a statement certifying that the fish were
caught in a proper manner and that all the information was true.1 6 The
exporter had to sign a declaration that the tuna were caught by vessels of
a state in compliance with the regulations.117 A party could not import
tuna for consumption from states whose vessels purse-seined for yellowfin tuna in the eastern tropical Pacific until further requirements
were met, including submitting to NMFS a description of the fishing
technology utilized and a report of how many marine mammals were
killed or seriously injured while fishing "on" porpoise 1 ' during the previous year. 19 The regulations for salmon and halibut were similar albeit
1 20
less stringent.
The 1984 amendments to the Act required the Commerce Department
to draw up stronger regulations governing foreign fishing.1 21 NMFS,
however, did not present the regulatory amendments until March 1988,
and these set absolute compliance for 1991.122 The delays prompted
United States Senator John Kerry to accuse the United States Commerce
and State Departments of "malaise, ' 123 although NMFS responded that
the issue was too complex to be dealt with through simple, quickly written rules. 24 One important concern, according to NMFS, was that affected foreign fleets would simply switch to less demanding markets.1 25
In a more sinister turn, however, a senior NMFS official admitted that
more stringent regulations were withdrawn after tuna fishers, both domestic and foreign, found them unacceptable. 26
The new rules promulgated by NMFS amend section 216 of 50

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. § 216.24(e)(4)(ii).
Id.
Id.
For an explanation of fishing "on" dolphin, see supra note 3.
Id.§ 216.24(e)(5).

120. Id. § 216.24(e)(3).
121. Saving the Sea Creatures, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 17, 1988, § II, at 8, col. 1.
122. 53 Fed. Reg. 8910, 8913 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1988); Croft, supra note 14, at 3,
col. 1.
123. Senate Panel Urged to Toughen Curbs on Killing of Dolphins, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 14, 1988, at A31, col. 1.
124. Id.
125. Id.; see also 53 Fed. Reg. at 8911-12.
126. Charles Fullerton, NMFS Southwest Division Director, observes, "We developed some [regulations] which were not acceptable either to the tuna industry or to the
foreign nations. So we went back to the drawing board and developed a whole new set..
. ." Brower, supra note 3, at 58.
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C.F.R. generally and subsection 216.24(e) in particular. 2 Many of the
changes, however, constitute little more than linguistic streamlining, ridding the regulations of redundant language. For example, the practical
effects of both the old subsection 216.24(e)(1) and the amended version
are aiguably the same; although the amended subsection 216.24(e)(1) no
longer requires a finding of incidental mortality and injury rates, 12 8 the
appropriate administrator must still make findings of a similar nature
under other paragraphs of this regulation. 2 9 Although NMFS observed
the letter of its obligation, the regulations on their face do not appear to
effect much, if any, real change other than simplifying the requirements
imposed on importers."'
The real teeth of the NMFS rule do not appear in the amended regulations themselves but in the initial import certification requirements 1 '
and the "Guidelines for Comparable Regulatory Programs and Mortality Rates."'3 2 Any state that is tuna fishing in the eastern tropical Pacific
with vessels large enough to set "on" dolphins must receive a finding of
conformity from NMFS before yellowfin tuna from that state can be
imported.' To obtain an initial finding of conformity, a state must at
least provide "reliable and verifiable" documentation of (1) the technological and procedural requirements mandated by its laws, guidelines,
and regulations and the accompanying enforcement program; (2) an observer program to monitor marine mammal mortality with specific and
detailed reporting requirements; (3) a program to help individual fishers
improve their performance; (4) a list and description of all vessels purseseining in the eastern tropical Pacific; and (5) detailed purse-seining performance data for previous years, including tons of yellowfin tuna caught
and numbers of marine mammals killed.' Any purse-seining set "on"
marine mammals causing the death of fifteen or more mammals is considered a "problem set" requiring additional effort by that state to re-

127. 53 Fed. Reg. at 8917-20 (codified at 50 C.F.R. §§ 216.3, 216.24 (1988)).
128. Compare 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(e)(1) (1987) with 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(e)(1)

(1988).
129. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R § 216.24(e)(4)(iii), (e)(5)(i)-(ii), (v)-(vi) (1988).
130. Bills of lading, a delineation of fishing method, and exporter declarations are no
longer required. Additionally, the statement signed by the government official or the vessel master is much simplified. Compare 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(e)(4) (1987) with 50 C.F.R.
§ 216.24(e)(3) (1988).
131. 53 Fed. Reg. 8910, 8913-14 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1988).
132. Id. at 8914-16.
133. Id. at 8913.
134. Id. at 8913-14.
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duce its mortality rate."3 5
Once a state obtains initial certification it must annually supply documentation to meet a two-pronged comparability test concerning the regulatory program and mortality rate."" The regulatory program test sets
out specific minimum obligations for comparable gear and procedural
requirements, observer programs, and advisory groups.' 7 These obligations include backdown procedures, strong lighting systems for nighttime
fishing, and observers on approximately one-third of all purse-seining
trips.' 38 This test went into effect in 1988.'1 Under the mortality rate
test, states must produce a decline in their kill-per-ton 40 rates until, in
1991, their kill rate, based on the lower of either a five year average or
the most recent year, is comparable to the United States kill rate for the
4
same period.1 '
4.

The Permit Requirements

The Act authorizes the United States Secretary of Commerce to issue
permits for taking or importing cetaceans.'14 The permit must specify
the number and species to be taken or imported, the location and humane manner of the taking 43 or the location from which they are to be
imported, the time period for which the permit runs, and any other appropriate conditions. 4 4 If the applicant seeks to take cetaceans due to
species or population stock over-population, the Secretary may not grant
the permit if he determines that it would be better to transplant some of
the animals to any area previously but not currently inhabited by the
species or stock. 145 If the applicant seeks to take the cetaceans for display
or research, the permit must also specify methods of capture, supervision,
135. Id. at 8914. Generally only a few porpoises will die in any one set, but so-called
"disaster sets," in which hundreds or thousands die, do occur. Brower, supra note 3, at
37.
136. 53 Fed. Reg. at 8914.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 8913.
140. Kill-per-ton is defined as "the number of small toothed cetacean marine mammals killed per ton of yellowfin tuna caught in sets made on marine mammals." 50
C.F.R. § 216.3 (1988).
141. 53 Fed. Reg. at 8914-15.
142. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(a) (1988).
143. The MMPA defines a humane taking as one that "involves the least possible
degree of pain and suffering practicable to the mammal involved." Id. § 1362(4).
144. Id. § 1374(b)(2).
145. Id. § 1374(b). The number the Secretary decides to transplant cannot exceed
the number that the applicant requests to take. Id.
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care, and transportation. The permit holder must subsequently file a report on its activities with the Secretary,1" 6 who may modify, suspend, or
revoke the permit if the holder violates it.1 47
The permit requirements have generated considerable litigation by
both environmental and fishing organizations. Perhaps the most promi14 8
nent case is Committeefor Humane Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson.
In Richardson,fourteen environmental organizations14 9 complained that
the regulations governing the issuance of permits for the incidental taking of porpoises did not comply with the Act's requirements.'" Under
the Act, the Secretary may waive the moratorium and issue permits for
takings and importation only if the Secretary is "assured" that such actions are scientifically sound and in accordance with the purposes of the
Act.151 The Act places this burden of proof on the permit seeker.1 52 The
resulting permit must identify "the number and kind of animals . . .
authorized to be taken or imported." 5 ' NMFS granted the American
Tunaboat Association a general permit containing restrictions on techniques and technology but without any apparent constraint on the number or species of animals to be taken. 1 " NMFS did this despite the requirements1 55 and despite receiving a letter from the MMC stating that
without extensive population studies, the MMC was not prepared to
state that the Secretary was properly assured of an increase in porpoise
populations if any takings occurred.1 56 NMFS already conceded that it
knew neither the population levels of the regulated animals nor the
157
likely effects of the regulations on those levels.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia granted
summary judgment for the plaintiffs and enjoined the issuance of the
permit until NMFS complied with the Act. 5 The court indicated its
rationale quite clearly: "Congress ... required that [NMFS] act only on
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. § 1374(c).
Id. § 1374(e).
414 F. Supp. 297 (D.D.C. 1976), modified 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
414 F. Supp. at 299. Non-named plaintiffs, plaintiff-intervenors, and amicus

curiae included Fund for Animals, Environmental Defense Fund, and Pacific Legal
Foundation, Id.

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id. at 302.
Id: at 303.
Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1374(b)(2)(A)).
Id. at 305.
Id. at 302-03.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 314-15.
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the basis of the very knowledge which the agency admits is unknown: the
effect of any proposed taking on optimum sustainable population
levels."' 59
The court derived its rationale from both the clear language of the
Act 60 and its legislative history, 61 especially a statement by Congressman Dingell, who declared:
Before issuing any permit for the taking of a marine mammal, the Secretary must first have it proven to his satisfaction that any taking is consistent with the purposes and policies of the act-that is to say, that taking
will not be to the disadvantage of the animals concerned. If he6 2 cannot
1
make that finding, he cannot issue a permit. It is that simple.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit generally affirmed the district court's factual and legal
findings, but it nevertheless stayed the injunction to prevent a shutdown
of the tuna fleet, reasoning that Congress did not want the Act to be so
stringently enforced that such burdensome consequences would flow. 6 '
In the late 1980s, permit litigation took an international turn in
Kokechik Fishermen's Association v. Secretary of Commerce."" There,
the Center for Environmental Education and the Kokechik Fishermen's
Association, an Alaskan commercial fishing organization, joined forces to
protest a permit that allowed the Federation of Japan Salmon Fisheries
Cooperative Association incidentally to take a certain number of Dall's
porpoise while fishing in United States waters.16 5 The fishing techniques
that the Japanese used made it likely that they would take not only
Dal's porpoises but several other species of marine mammals. 6 While
159. Id. at 311.
160. Id. at 309-10.
161. Id. at 310-11.
162. Id. at 310 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 7686 (1972) (emphasis added by the
court).
163. Committee for Humane Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson, 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C.
Cir. 1976). The court observed, "It is clear that Congress did not intend that the Marine
Mammal Protection Act would force American tuna fishermen to cease operations .... "
Id. at 1149. The Committee Report read, "It is not the intention of the [Senate Commerce] Committee to shut down or significantly to curtail the activities of the tuna fleet
so long as the Secretary is satisfied that the tuna fishermen are using economically and
technologically practicable measures to assure minimal hazards to marine mammal populations." Id. at 1148 (quoting S. REP. No. 863, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1972)).
164. 839 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Verity v. Center for
Environmental Education, 109 S. Ct. 783 (1989).
165. Id. at 796-97.
166. Id. at 799-800. The other species likely taken by the Japanese fishing techniques included northern fur seals, northern sea lions, harbor porpoises, Pacific white-
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the Act does permit de minimis incidental takings by United States citizens, 67 it does not also grant that privilege to foreign fishing fleets, nor
does it allow the United States Secretary of Commerce to do so by fiat.' 68
As the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit clearly stated, "The Secretary has no authority, by regulation or any
other action, to issue a permit that allows conduct prohibited by that
Act."' 69 The Secretary apparently contended that to interpret the
MMPA so strictly as to deny the permit because of negligible takings of
marine mammals 170 would prevent him from properly carrying out the
balancing required by the Act and the regulations. The court disagreed,
declaring that "[t]he MMPA does not allow for a Solomonic balancing
of the animals' and fisheries' interests. 17' The court added that if the
Secretary thought that the statute wrongly denied him the flexibility to
do his job, then he should seek his remedy in Congress rather than
through blatantly ignoring the Act's provisions.' 72
5. The Results of the Restrictions
The United States apparently enacted the restrictions because it has a
large market for cetaceans and cetacean products and for fish whose
catching involves incidental takings of cetaceans; import restrictions
should cause other states to fall in step with United States efforts to aid
global conservation. 73 Some commentators debate whether the United
States really has a large enough market for whale products for the import restrictions to have much effect on international protection for
whales. ' 4 The MMPA has lived up to predictions, however, that its
sided dolphins, and killer whales. Id. at 800.
167. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(4) (1988).
168. 839 F.2d at 802 ("It . . . appears that Congress did not intend to loosen
MMPA requirements in order to accommodate Federation needs . . .
169. Id.
170. Despite this, the Secretary was unable to determine whether the impact of the
takings would actually be negligible. Id. at 801.
171. Id. at 802.
172. The court wrote, "If the Secretary believes the Act needs amendment, then it is
Congress he must address. The horse must stay ahead of the cart." Id. The court continued, "If it is appropriate to grant foreign commercial fishermen some leeway to take
marine mammals incidentally in carrying out their commercial fishing operations for
salmon, it is for the Congress, not the Secretary to decide." Id. Congress has to an extent
given the Secretary his remedy. See infra notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
173. E.g., Kindt, supra note 11, at 13. Half of the world's canned tuna is marketed
in the United States. West 57th, supra note 3, at 10.
174. Compare Scarff, The International Management of Whales, Dolphins, and
Porpoises:An InterdisciplinaryAssessment (pt. 2), 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 571, 600-01 (1977)
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restrictions would have an international impact.. 5 and cause a serious
1
decline in porpoise mortality.

76

It is possible to frustrate the purposes of the MMPA. United States
tuna fishers avoid the Act by adopting a flag of convenience,17 7 the practice of registering and sailing a vessel under the flag of another state that
exerts little effective control over the ship.17 8 Some commentators estimate that one-half to two-thirds of the United States fleet engage in this
practice.1 79 The tightening of import restrictions should make this a less
attractive and less effective alternative to taking the required conservation measures. The Act, however, has been unable to prevent tuna fishers from simply selling their catch in more availing markets,1 80 and
NMFS has expressed concern that its more stringent regulations will
encourage sales to these alternative markets."
Despite these loopholes, the MMPA has successfully protected
cetaceans. In 1976 and 1977, the United States Government forced the
United States tuna fleet to stop purse-seining because of excessive por-

(observing that the MMPA, along with the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 153143, "had a significant impact on the international trade in whale products, because [in
the early 1970s] the United States accounted for about one-fifth of the entire world market for whale products") with Smith, supra note 20, at 566 (declaring that "[b]ecause the
whaling nations are not dependent upon the American market, the Marine Mammal
Protection Act and the 1969 and 1973 Endangered Species Acts have been unsuccessful
in limiting worldwide whaling simply by closing the American market").
175. E.g., Kindt, supra note 11, at 7 ("U.S. control of the market for yellowfins
coupled with the MMPA's import restrictions on fish caught in violation of its guidelines
should encourage other countries to implement their own conservation programs.").
176. For figures detailing the annual estimates for porpoise takings by United States
fishers in the eastern tropical Pacific from 1972-81, see Recent Development, supra note
2, at 273 n.91 (quoting 1981 MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 42
(1982)). In 1987, United States tuna fishers killed 14,000 porpoises. Saving the Sea
Creatures,supra note 121, at 8, col. 1. Foreign fleets kill many more, id. at col. 2, but
the effects of the MMPA on them have been strong. See infra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
177. Kindt & Wintheiser, supra note 5, at 347.
178. Comment, supra note 20, at 130.
179. West 57th, supra note 3, at 10. States to which United States ships have reflagged include Panama, Ecuador, Venezuela, Korea, Mexico, and Vanuatu. Id. As one
commentator notes, "The separation of the U.S. and foreign tuna industries is in fact a
kind of myth." Brower, supra note 3, at 58. For example, six boats operating out of
Vanuatu are ultimately owned by a United States company. In another case, a Mexican
company, forty-nine percent owned by a United States cannery, owns another ten tuna
fishing boats. West 57th, supra note 3, at 11.
180. Comment, supra note 20, at 136 n.230.
181. 53 Fed. Reg. 8910, 8911 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1988).
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poise takings.1 82 In October 1986, NMFS repeated this action, banning
purse-seining on dolphins for the rest of the year to prevent mortality
rates from surpassing the annual quota. 18 3 Because of the 1984 amendments, 8 4 this action not only affected the United States fleet but also
prevented importation of yellowfin tuna from states not in compliance
with the order.1 8 5
Although alternative markets for yellowfin tuna may exist, all states,
with the exception of Mexico, which have the required findings of conformity are "very dependent" on the United States to buy their catch
from the eastern tropical Pacific. 8 ' The regulations prevented some importation from the Congo, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, Senegal, and the
Soviet Union. 87 As a result of the MMPA, the Congo, New Zealand,
Senegal, and Spain suggested that their fleets follow United States porpoise release procedures.188 More important, Bermuda, Canada, the Republic of Korea, Nicaragua, and New Zealand stopped purse-seining in
the eastern tropical Pacific; the Congo, Peru, and Senegal removed their
fleets from that area entirely. 8 9 In October 1988, NMFS announced
that the United States would enforce the 1988 regulations and would no
longer accept yellowfin tuna imported from Ecuador, Panama, Vanuatu,
and Venezuela because those states failed to submit the proper documentation for a finding of conformity.1 90 NMFS also continued a previously
announced embargo of yellowfin tuna from El Salvador and the Soviet
Union."'

182. Recent Development, supra note 2, at 272.
183. U.S. Bans Dolphin Kills for Rest of Year, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 15, 1986, §
I, at 3, col. 1 [hereinafter U.S. Bans].
184. See supra notes 10-16, 121-26 and accompanying text.
185. See U.S. Bans, supra note 183, at 23, col. 2.
186. 53 Fed. Reg. at 8911. These states include the Cayman Islands, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Panama, Spain, Vanuatu, and Venezuela. Id.
187.

Id.

188.

Kindt, supra note 11, at 7-8.

189.

53 Fed. Reg. at 8911.

190. 53 Fed. Reg. 39,743, at 39,743-44 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1988). In December 1988,
NMFS also banned importation from Spain for failure to submit documentation. This
was the result of one Ecudorian-based vessel sailing under the Spanish flag. NMFS
suggested that if Spain could prove that the vessel was actually operating under Ecuadorian law, the ban could be lifted. 53 Fed. Reg. 50,420 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1988).
191.

53 Fed. Reg. at 39,743.
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B.

The Marine Mammal Protection Act's Treaty Program

The MMPA does not explicitly pre-empt any existing treaties or implementing statutes.192 If the United States Secretary of Commerce finds
that the Act has been applied in contravention of such a treaty or statute,
the Secretary may order the Act's penalty provisions not to apply to that
19 3
party.
To prevent conflicts between the MMPA and international agreements and to enhance international compliance with United States conservation goals, the Act directs the United States Secretaries of Commerce and State to seek further international agreements to protect
cetaceans. 94 The general provision, entitled the Act's International Program, instructs these Secretaries (1) to negotiate international protection
treaties,' 95 in particular with states whose commercial fishing fleets are
"unduly harmful" to cetaceans; 96 (2) to promote treaties that support
conservation in specific geographic areas that are critical to cetacean protection;. 9 (3) to negotiate amendments to existing international protection treaties to make them compatible with the MMPA;' 9 8 and (4) to
convene an international marine mammal summit to further these
efforts.' 99
More specifically, the Act instructs the Secretaries to negotiate with
the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission to bring member states
into compliance with the regulations that are designed to reduce incidental takings by tuna fishers. Pursuant to MMPA, the Secretaries must
also request the organization's Director of Investigations to advocate the
use of improved fishing gear developed by the United States research and

192. 16 U.S.C. § 1383 (1988).
193. Id.
194. See generally id. §§ 1378(a), 1381(c).
195. Id. § 1378(a)(1).
196. Id. § 1378(a)(2)(A). To help meet this requirement, the Secretary of State is to
"prepare a draft agenda relating to this matter for discussion at appropriate international
meetings and forums." Id.
197. Id. § 1378(a)(3). For example, in 1980 the United States entered into the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, done May 20, 1980,
33 U.S.T. 3476, T.I.A.S. No. 10,240. In 1989, the Department of Commerce issued
regulations bringing the act implementing the Convention into line with the MMPA. 54
Fed. Reg. 6407 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1989) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. 380).
198. 16 U.S.C. § 1378(a)(4) (1988). For example, the Convention for the High Sea
Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, done May 9, 1952, United States-Canada-Japan, 4
U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786, 205 U.N.T.S. 65, was re-negotiated to make the Japanese subject to the MMPA's requirements. Kindt & Wintheiser, supra note 5, at 353.
199. 16 U.S.C. § 1378(a)(5).
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development program.20 0
1. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
Since the passage of the MMPA, the United States has entered into
several treaties for the protection of marine mammals, although not all of
these involve cetaceans. 20 ' Perhaps the most important of these is the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (CITES).20 2 This treaty, which seeks to protect endangered species from depletion from trade,2 03 declares that trade in species
threatened with extinction must be allowed only in "exceptional circumstances" 2 ' and that trade in those species that may later become
threatened with extinction must be regulated to avoid over-exploitation.2 0 5 The treaty also gives any party the right to adopt even stricter
regulations.2 06 The treaty indicates that six species of cetaceans are
threatened with extinction and, therefore, effectively prohibits their trade
among parties.20 7 CITES does not list any cetaceans that may later be
come threatened by extinction.20 8 Critics claim' that the treaty has loopholes 20 9 and worry that enforcement may be difficult since it is often
impossible to determine whether a product being traded contains parts
from protected species. 210 Despite these criticisms, the treaty represents a
significant international stand favoring the protection of species
threatened with depletion.

200. Id. § 1381(c). The research and development program is set out in subsection
1381(a).
201. E.g., Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, done Nov. 15, 1973, 27
U.S.T. 3918, T.I.A.S No. 8409.
202. Done Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249 [hereinafter CITES].
203. Id. preamble.
204. Id. art. II, para. 1.
205. Id. art. II, para. 2.
206. Id. art. II, para. 3.
207. Id. art. II, appendix I. These species are the Ganges susu, the gray whale, the
blue whale, the humpback whale, the bowhead whale, and the right whale. Id. appendix
I. For a translation of the scientific names listed in CITES to their common names, see
S. LEATHERWOOD & R. REEVES, THE SIERRA CLUB HANDBOOK OF WHALES AND
DOLPHINS 32, 37, 47, 72, 77, 281 (1983).
208. See CITES, supra note 202, art. II, appendix II. Unlike appendix I, appendix
II has no listing for cetacea.
209. E.g., Coggins, supra note 27, at 13.
210. Scarff, supra note 174, at 602-03.

19891
2.

MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT

The Whaling Convention

The United States also acts to increase international protection of
cetaceans, especially whales, through the International Whaling Commission (IWC), established by the Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling (Whaling Convention). 2 ' In 1979, the IWC created a ten-year
International Whale Sanctuary in the Indian Ocean.2 12 In 1982, acting
pursuant to its MMPA obligations,2 13 the United States convinced the
IWC to pass an amendment to the Whaling Convention that created a
moratorium on commercial whaling.2" 4
The moratorium, however, binds only those who agree to be constrained; an IWC member who objects to an amendment within ninety
days of the vote is not bound.2"' Japan, the Soviet Union, Chile, Norway, and Peru objected to the moratorium and, therefore, are not
bound.2" 6 Because Japan and the Soviet Union are the world's foremost
211. Done Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S 72 [hereinafter Whaling Convention].
212. Kindt, supra note 11, at 11.
213. 16 U.S.C. § 1378(a)(4) (1988) (requiring the United States to seek amendment
of existing treaties to bring them in line with the MMPA). For support for the proposition that the United States decision to press for the moratorium was prompted by the
MMPA, see Kindt & Wintheiser, supra note 5, at 352; Zimmerman, supra note 4, at
268.
214. Comment, supra note 20, at 115. The amendment reads:
Catch limits for the killing for commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for
the 1986 coastal and the 1985/86 pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be zero.
This provision will be kept under review, based upon the best scientific advice, and
by 1990 at the latest the Commission will undertake a comprehensive assessment
of the effects of this decision on whale stocks and consider modification of this
provision and the establishment of other catch limits.
Id. at 115 n.7.
The following states voted for the moratorium: Antigua, Argentina, Australia, Belize,
Costa Rica, Denmark, Egypt, France, India, Kenya, Mexico, Monaco, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Oman, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Senegal, Seychelles, Spain, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, and West Germany. Brazil, Iceland, Japan, Norway, Peru,,South Korea, and the Soviet Union opposed the moratorium. Five
states-Chile, China, the Philippines, South Africa, and Switzerland-abstained. Dominica and Jamaica were not present. Smith, supra note 20, at 557 n.109.
215. Whaling Convention, supra note 211, art. V, para. 3. Once one member objects, the ninety day period begins to run anew. Id. Members also have the power to
withdraw after six months notice and have been known to threaten to use this power to
block protectionist action by the IWC. Smith, supra note 20, at 548.
216. Smith, supra note 20, at 557-58. Japan claims that its opposition is not only
commercial but also cultural, citing a "desire for whale meat [that] has traditional roots
deeply imbedded in the Japanese psyche." Id. at 558- n. 113 (citing N.Y. Times, Aug. 14,
1982, at A22, col. 1). Several states also claim that the moratorium violates the Whaling
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whaling states, 17 their objections severely undercut the effectiveness of
the moratorium. It is relatively easy to avoid IWC regulations, including
the Whaling Convention moratorium, by using a flag of convenience.2 18
Some claim that the IWC is not the proper vehicle for protection of
cetaceans generally."1 9 The IWC itself repeatedly rebuffs attempts to expand its authority to cover small cetaceans.220 Still, many continue to
argue that, especially given its emerging tendency toward conservation,
the IWC should be expanded to cover cetaceans rather than create a new
organization.22 At the very least, the IWC is the proper organization for
the regulation of whaling because it contains the most important whaling
states. A new and intensely conservationist, international organization
would not contain whaling states and therefore would have little effect
222
on whaling.
IV.

THE

1988 AMENDMENTS

223
In 1988, concerned about the implications of the Kokechik decision
but still desiring to protect porpoises from tuna fishers,224 Congress
amended the MMPA. 225 The most important amendments are a new
section creating an "Interim period for commercial fisheries12 26 and additions to the sections governing the moratorium 227 and treaty

Convention because it does not consider the interests of whale consumers. Comment,
supra note 20, at 123 n.90.
217. Travalio & Clement, supra note 30, at 210 n.77.
218. Scarff, supra note 174, at 598; see also supra notes 177-79 and accompanying
text (describing a flag of convenience).
219. E.g., Comment, supra note 20, at 116.
220. For example, in 1974 the United States offered an amendment to the Whaling
Convention to extend the IWC's management power to small cetaceans, but consideration of this was postponed pending the resolution of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Scarff, supra note 174, at 618-19. In 1975, the IWC's
Scientific Committee proposed a similar but more narrow amendment, which the IWC
did not pass. Scarff, supra note 3, at 374.
221. E.g., Kindt, supra note 11, at 12.
222. Smith, supra note 20, at 562.
223. 839 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Verity v. Center for
Environmental Education, 109 S.Ct. 783 (1989); see supra notes 164-72 and accompanying text; H.R. REP. No. 970, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6154, 6159 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
224. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 223, at 6170.
225. Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-711,
102 Stat. 4755 (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
226. 16 U.S.C. § 1383a (1988).
227. Id. § 1371(a)(2).
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A.

The Interim Exemption

To avoid penalizing or shutting down many fishers, 2 9 Congress
amended the MMPA by creating a five-year period for both United
States and foreign fishers2 30 during which time the United States Secretary of Commerce may grant exemptions that authorize commercial fishers to take cetaceans incidentally, even from depleted stocks.23 , The Secretary divides commercial fisheries into three categories: (I) those where
fishers frequently take marine mammals incidentally; (II) those where
fishers occasionally take marine mammals incidentally; and (III) those
where fishers never take marine mammals incidentally or have only a
remote likelihood of so doing.2" 2 Fishers in Category III fisheries pose
2 33
little threat to preservation and are, therefore, largely left alone.
Those who fish in Category I and II fisheries may receive exemptions by
meeting simple requirements.23 4
An exemption means that the United States will not penalize a vessel
for incidental takings.23 5 To maintain the exemption, the vessel owner

228. Id. § 1378(a).
229. 54 Fed. Reg. 21,910 (daily ed. May 19, 1989).
230. 16 U.S.C. 1383a(a)(1).
231. Id. § 1383a(b)(2)(C). Permits cannot authorize intentional takings of cetaceans
that result in death. Id.
232. Id. § 1383a(b)(1)(A). According to the NMFS regulations, Category I fisheries
are those in which there is a great likelihood that a vessel selected at random will take
more than one marine mammal in a twenty day period. 54 Fed. Reg. 21,910, at 21,922
(daily ed. May 19, 1989) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 229.3 (b)(1)). In a Category II
fishery, a vessel selected at random would probably not take more than one marine mammal during a twenty day period. Id. (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 229.3(b)(2)). A vessel
in a Category III fishery would probably not take any marine mammals during a twenty
day period. Id. at 21,922-23 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 229.3(b)(3)). For a list of
fishery categorizations, see id. at 16,072.
233. 16 U.S.C. § 1383a(b)(3)(E). The only statutory requirement on owners of such
vessels is that they report, after the fact, any takings resulting in death. Id. The regulations issued pursuant to the 1988 amendments allow vessels in Category III fisheries to
take marine mammals intentionally "to protect catch, gear or person during the course of
commercial fishing operations." 54 Fed. Reg. at 21,924 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. §
229.7(d)). If the fishers take such actions and they are unsuccessful at preventing "substantial and immediate damage," the regulations authorize lethal takings, although
NMFS prohibits such takings of several marine mammal species, including all cetaceans.
Id. (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. 229.7(e)).
234. 16 U.S.C. 1383a(b)(2)(A).
235. Id. 1383a(b)(3)(D). Exempt vessels must display a decal issued by NMFS. 54
Fed. Reg. at 21,923 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. 229.6(a), (b)). Some have expressed

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 22:997

must submit a report to the Secretary either yearly or at the close of each
fishing season. 23 6 The report must include (1) the date, time, and location of all takings; (2) the fishing gear used and the fish sought; (3) the
number and species of the marine mammals taken in each taking; and
(4) the marine mammals' reactions to the fishing gear.
If the vessel
does not incidentally take any marine mammals, it must also report this
fact.

23 8

The exemption amendment generally requires the Secretary to place
observers on twenty to thirty percent of all exempted vessels to obtain
"statistically reliable information" on the takings.23 9 Observers are not
required if the Secretary finds that the information usually gathered will
not assist in conservation of marine mammals or the marine ecosystem.240 Even if the Secretary does place observers on exempt vessels,
there is some question as to how "statistically reliable" the information
they provide will be. Past observers have reported harassment, briber),
attempts, and threats on their lives by crews and captains who wanted
the reports of kills to be lower than the actual figures. 24 ' New NMFS

fears that this could stigmatize the vessels and provoke attacks by "radical animal rights
groups." Id. at 21,912.
236. 16 U.S.C. § 1383a(c).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. § 1383a(e)(1). This provision sets priorities for observers: Category I vessels
receive first priority. If there are not enough observers to cover all Category I fisheries,
then the provision gives priority first, to those Category I fisheries where depleted marine
mammals are taken; second, to those Category I fisheries where population stocks are
declining; third, to Category I fisheries not listed above where the most incidental takings
occur; and last to any other Category I fishery. 54 Fed. Reg. at 21,914.
240. 16 U.S.C. § 1383a(e)(5).
241. Kenneth Marten, a government observer, declared in a sworn affidavit that
[tihe fishermen resented the presence of a government observer and engaged in
every possible form of harassment and coercion. . . . I was prevented, on many
occasions, from counting the actual number of animals killed. The fishermen
would throw seal bombs at me so that I would retreat from the observation post.
Brower, supra note 3, at 48. On another occasion, Marten felt that the captain
threatened his life after reading Marten's log book account of the number of deaths
incurred in an illegal set on eastern spinner dolphins. Id. at 52. Another observer reported that
it was made clear to me that if I reported lower kill figures than actually occurred
I would be treated by the captain and crew in a much better manner. There were
a variety of offers made to me to report lower kill figures, all of which constituted
in my mind a form of bribery. The pressure put on observers in this capacity is
almost indescribable.
Id. at 48 (statement of Thomas Jefferson).
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regulations prohibit these coercive activities,242 but these prohibitions are
undercut by another NMFS regulation that prevents observers from
bringing civil suits against vessels or their owners unless the observer
was injured while working as a crew member or by the owner's "willful
misconduct."'2 43 Despite new NMFS regulations, "negligent" harassment
probably will increase. NMFS has also announced plans to create another program to verify takings,2 44 although this program is directed
more at vessels with inadequate facilities for observers than at increasing
the accuracy of observer reports.24 5
If the Secretary finds that the exempted incidental takings are having
an immediate and severe detrimental impact on a population stock, the
Secretary must promulgate emergency regulations.2 46 These regulations
are to be as limited as possible and reflect the needs of the affected stock,
the likely economic impact of the regulations on the fishers, and the existence of the appropriate technology to put an end to the emergency.247 If
it appears that a severe detrimental impact is likely but not immediate,
the Secretary must merely request the appropriate regional management
authority to consider mitigating actions. 248 The amendments direct the
MMC and the Secretary to draft guidelines and additional legislation to
go into effect when the exemption ends in 1993.249

Through these additions to the MMPA, which create simple exemption requirements 250 and allow a wide range of incidental takings, including the intentional mortal takings of some non-cetacean marine
mammals, 25x Congress fulfilled much of the Secretary's desired flexibility
in issuing permits, which was denied in Kokechik Fishermen's Association v. Secretary of Commerce.2 52 While these amendments were in fact
prompted by the Kokechik decision,25 3 Congress explicitly left undisturbed the factual holding in that case and, thus, precluded the operation
242. 54 Fed. Reg. at 21,923 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 229.4(2)).
243. Id. at 21,924 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 229.6(c)(3)(vi)).
244. Id. at 21,913-14.
245. Id. at 21,913. NMFS plans to station observers some place other than the fishing vessel being observed. Id. at 21,913-14.
246. 16 U.S.C. § 1383a(g)(2).
247. Id.; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 223, at 6166.
248. 16 U.S.C. § 1383a(g)(3).
249. Id. § 1383a(b)(1), (3)-(4).
250. Id. § 1383a(b)(2)(C).
251. Id. § 1383a(c).
252. 839 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Verity v. Center for
Environmental Education, 109 S. Ct. 783 (1989); see supra notes 164-72 and accompanying text.
253. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 223, at 6159.
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of the Japanese salmon gillnet fleet in the United States Exclusive Eco254
nomic Zone.
B.

Additional Protectionfor Porpoisesfrom Tuna Fishers

The interim exemption does not apply to incidental takings by commercial yellowfin tuna fishers; 255 existing provisions and additions to
them will govern these actions. The additions to the moratorium tighten
the requirements for a finding that a state has a regulatory program
comparable to that of the United States. 56 A comparable program must
include (1) prohibitions on the encirclement of pure schools of cetaceans,
on sundown sets, and on other activities prohibited to United States vessels; (2) an average incidental taking rate that is no more than 125 percent of that of United States vessels by the end of 1990; (3) incidental
takings that are comprised of no more than fifteen percent eastern spinner dolphin and no more than two percent coastal spotted dolphin; (4)
monitoring through a reliable observation program; 257 and (5) compliance with reasonable scientific research requests by the United States
Secretary of Commerce.2 5 Intermediary states259 exporting yellowfin
tuna to the United States must certify and supply "reasonable proof"
that they have prohibited importation of tuna from any state that could
not directly export tuna to the United States. 6" States that are both har-

254. Id. at 21. This preclusion is a result of the provision that requires foreign fishers to have a valid permit issued under the Magnuson Act. Id. The United States Department of Commerce opposed this limitation because it feared damage to United
States-Japanese relations and foresaw difficulties in negotiations on other fisheries issues.
Letter from Linda A. Townsend, Department of Commerce, to Gerry E. Studds, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment
(Sept. 13, 1988), reprinted in id. at 6179 [hereinafter Commerce Letter].
255. 16 U.S.C. § 1383a(a)(2) (1988).
256. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(B).
257. NMFS has suggested the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission's international observer program as one such program capable of providing "sufficiently reliable
documentary evidence," 54 Fed. Reg. 20,171 (daily ed. May 10, 1989), despite "differences in sampling objectives." Id. at 20,173. Fleets from Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico,
Panama, Spain, the United States, Vanuatu, and Venezuela took part in this program in
1988. Id. at 20,171. For a discussion of the reliability of observer programs, see supra
notes 239-45 and accompanying text.
258. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(V)(B).
259. Amended regulations issued pursuant to this provision define an intermediary
state as one "which exports yellowfin tuna or tuna products to the United States, and
which imports yellowfin tuna or tuna products." 54 Fed. Reg. 9438, 9448 (daily ed.
Mar. 7, 1989) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 216.3).
260. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(C). The United States Department of Commerce
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vesters and intermediaries must meet both sets of requirements.2"'
The amendments direct the United States Secretaries of Commerce
and State to begin discussions through the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission or some other appropriate organization to conclude
agreements with states that are purse-seining in the eastern tropical Pacific.26 2 The agreements should contemplate the protection of marine
mammals incidentally taken by those fishers. They should also provide
for research into both tuna fishing methods that do not harm cetaceans
and the condition of their population stocks so that the states party to
these agreements can monitor takings, limit take levels, and determine
the most economically and technologically feasible fishing equipment capable of seriously reducing takings.263

In the face of actions to give more leeway to commercial fishers who
incidentally take marine mammals, these amendments hold the MMPA
true to its primary purpose of protecting porpoises from purse-seiners.
V.

CONCLUSION

The tide will not turn in the battle for protection of cetaceans until
that effort becomes much more fully multilateral. Until that time, it is
important for the United States to keep pressing forward in unilateral
attempts to use its vast economic and political power to provide what
protection it can beyond its boundaries. It is difficult to gauge how far
the United States is willing to go to achieve a transnational impact. So
far, Congress is at best sporadic in creating effective legislation, and enforcement by the executive branch is embarrassingly lax.
As the United States District Court for the District of Columbia stated
in Committee for Humane Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson, "Steps
which ensure the protection and conservation of our national environment must, almost inevitably, impose temporary hardships on those commercial interests which have long benefited by exploiting that environment."2 64 The same is true for protection of the international

opposed this provision, finding it overbroad and "counterproductive" and suggested its
own watered-down alternative. Commerce Letter, supra note 254, at 6181.
261. 54 Fed. Reg. at 9448 (1989) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(e)(3)(i)). For
a more detailed account of the requirements that the United States is likely to impose on
both categories of states, see the information and interim final rule set forth in id. at
9438-51 (regulations to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 216).
262. 16 U.S.C. § 1378(a)(2)(B).
263. Id.
264. 414 F. Supp. 297, 314 (D.D.C. 1976), modified, 510 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
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environment. For the most part, however, Congress is unwilling to take
the necessary protective steps when there are resulting economic hardships to the commercial interests of parties related to the United
2 5
States.
Optimistically, the United States followed its legislative mandate and
ardently pursued the interests of whales with the IWC. The fervor of
United States efforts in this endeavor can perhaps be explained, however, by the small cost, barring retaliation by Japan, of the whaling moratorium to United States commercial interests.
When United States economic interests are more directly and obviously involved, the United States provides little more than paper protection for cetaceans. With the exemption provided in the 1988 amendments, Congress allows exploitation of cetaceans to continue. More
ominously, even in areas in which Congress takes strong protectionist
action, the executive branch favors commercial interests with lax enforcement26" and a regulatory program easily influenced by fishing industry
lobbyists.2 87
One hopes the interim exemption will be simply a temporary measure
which Congress will replace with a tighter set of rules to further protect
cetaceans and that Congress will also strengthen the rules that currently
protect porpoises from tuna fishers. It is perhaps wise to remember,
however, that the need for strong statutory language is surpassed by a
need for strong executive enforcement; without the latter, fulfillment of
the former is meaningless.
Laura L. Lones

265. See, e.g., supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text (describing flags of
convenience).
266. See Brower, supra note 3, at 52 (details of a 1987 United States Department of
Commerce investigation). Brower observes, "Fines have been so low compared to incomes that skippers have knowingly violated the regulations and accepted the fines." Id.
267. In 1980, tuna lobbyists convinced NMFS to withdraw a regulation banning
sundown sets only eight days after it went into effect. Id. at 58; see also supra note 125
and accompanying text.

